AttestZ — Verify

The offline verifier checks an evidence pack entirely on your device — no network request, no dependency on AttestZ staying online or acting in good faith. Open the verifier or download it below; it is a single self-contained HTML file you can save anywhere and it keeps working.

Checked against AttestZ checkpoint keys:
ECDSA: arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-2:842675985647:key/88d3494f-4c54-483c-9c2a-663983cb6b19
ML-DSA: arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-2:842675985647:key/9ab52c03-478d-4937-bc61-e2b6aedacb93
Pinned public keys (SHA-384 of the DER public key):
ECDSA: ac5334044865712d1b94f91e25d220acc2e8ba3ce80b273f539f0171e4d5dab179519e6f3ca24df7e0d9fb3d3c99f837
ML-DSA: 5457e5a1a589c373156779209d8dced299bb3fc1976e2cc8fb0e9c16c158d334424619b0028fd90d3471fa904ba16237
Compare the two key ARNs against the same two values on the transparency page and in the cryptographic bill of materials (docs/CBOM.md in the source repository).
A pack signed by any other key is not an AttestZ record. The verifier checks every checkpoint's key ARN and public key against these two pinned identities — not merely against whatever public keys happen to be included in a pack. A pack that verifies against different keys, however internally consistent it looks, was not produced by AttestZ, even if it copies AttestZ's key ARN.

Try it yourself

Download the demo pack, or any of the six deliberately tampered variants below, and run them through the verifier above. Each pack is labelled with the exact line the verifier prints for it, so you can confirm the verifier says what this page claims rather than taking our word for it.

The demo pack is not an AttestZ record, and the verifier says so. It is signed with demonstration keys generated for this page, not with AttestZ's checkpoint keys, although it carries AttestZ's key ARN. The verifier therefore reports NOT VERIFIED: the two key-identity checks fail by design and every other check (chain, completeness, inclusion, checkpoint hash, both signatures) passes. That is exactly what you should see for any pack AttestZ did not sign. The tampered variants are built from the demo pack, so they fail the same two identity checks as well as the line shown for each.

PackVerifier's verdict
Demo pack (demonstration keys) ⛔ checkpoint chk-2026-08-30: ECDSA key identity: key_id arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-2:842675985647:key/88d3494f-4c54-483c-9c2a-663983cb6b19 with the public key in keys.json is NOT AttestZ's pinned checkpoint key — signed by an unknown key, this is not an AttestZ record Download
Edited payload ⛔ chain: acme: seq 1: payload_hash mismatch Download
Deleted entry ⛔ completeness: acme @ 2026-08-30: recomputed root from the 1 entries present does NOT equal the checkpoint's signed tenant_roots[acme] — an entry has been added, removed, or altered since checkpointing Download
Reordered entries ⛔ chain: acme: seq 2: broken prev_hash link Download
Forged signature ⛔ checkpoint chk-2026-08-30: ECDSA signature: does NOT verify — forged, wrong key, or altered record Download
Unknown key ⛔ checkpoint chk-2026-08-30: ECDSA key identity: key_id arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-2:000000000000:key/attacker with the public key in keys.json is NOT AttestZ's pinned checkpoint key — signed by an unknown key, this is not an AttestZ record Download
Unauthorised redaction ⛔ payload: e2 (seq 2): payload absent with NO authorising redaction entry in this pack — MISSING WITHOUT AUTHORISATION, this is not a valid redaction Download

See every checkpoint AttestZ has actually issued →